

**Federal Government of Somalia
Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation
&
Federal Member States of Jubaland, South West,
Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Puntland and Benadir
Regional Administration**

**Stabilization Strategy
2018-2020**

**Version 2.0
Updated September 2018**



1. Introduction

President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo in his inauguration address on 22 February 2017 noted the challenge of insecurity and pledged to *“uphold the rule of law, strengthen the judiciary, restore confidence of the people in the government and tackle poverty”*. The President also recognized the contribution made by the international community, particularly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in stabilizing Somalia. In line with the Government’s “Nabad iyo Nolol” (Peace and Life) strategy, the updated Stabilization Strategy will focus on delivering a comprehensive approach to community recovery and the extension of state authority and accountability by combining the efforts of international partners, the UN, and AMISOM under the leadership of the Somali Government. The stabilization strategy will be accompanied by stabilization plans that will address specific priorities and challenges in Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Benadir Region, as well as in Puntland as required.

The Stabilization Strategy is to be regarded as a living document that builds on the previous iterations, by both reinforcing many of the initial principles and also reflecting the changes in the context and evolving challenges including those set forth in the Government’s Transition Plan to help prioritize and align activities at the accompanying stabilization plans. Overall, it seeks to promote a more inclusive and coherent set of interventions that:

- Focus on Somali civilian leadership, ownership and oversight including political progress through the formation of the Federal Member States and the development of state level plans and updated coordination structures
- Incorporate lessons learnt in coherence and sequencing, for example by strengthening links between social reconciliation interventions with rule of law, community recovery and local governance interventions, whilst retaining coherence with the broader Transition Strategy
- Expand geographic coverage to areas and districts where fragility persists as well as supporting security efforts, in order to ensure appropriate and balanced support to areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab control and neglected or under-developed areas

In doing so, it reflects the commitments made by the Somalia authorities and the international community in the *‘New Partnership for Somalia, for Peace, Stability and Prosperity’* framework and the *Security Pact* that were endorsed at the London Conference in May 2017. Both of which recognized the progress made since the Government launched its initial stabilization efforts led by the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs under the Somali Compact in 2013. The subsequent Security Conference hosted by the Somali Government in Mogadishu on 4 December 2018 led to the adoption of the Government’s Transition Plan in March 2018. The National Security architecture together with the Transition Plan provide the platform to enable the Government to gradually assume full responsibility for security, and in doing the importance of stabilization activities in the overall state-building goals of the country is emphasized.

The combined intent of the Stabilization Strategy and the transition process outlined by the Government and its partners is to build on a number of positive developments including the

evolution of federal structures and systems that reflect the growing political progress in the country. However, it also acknowledged these gains have been fragile and in some cases reversible due to continued volatility and insecurity caused by and exploited by Al-Shabaab. In addition, a number of interventions were often *ad hoc* and not connected to other initiatives. The updated strategy seeks to build on lessons learnt amongst stabilization stakeholders. It therefore underscores the importance of increasing capacity of key Somali institutions to lead coordination efforts, develop and implement policies and interventions in a coherent and sequenced manner, as well as the broader security and developmental strategies.

2. Fragility Assessment

The national consultation on reconciliation hosted by the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR) in June 2017 highlighted the historical complexities, the evolution of the conflict and the accompanying drivers of fragility in Somalia. These included the challenges faced by the government in balancing a combination of both Somali-specific and broader religious issues with building a modern state, as well as identifying a range of underlying root-causes in the conflict e.g. factionalism, access to resources, inequality and exclusion of minorities and women¹. These political and conflict challenges are also compounded by other factors including recurrent natural disasters.

Despite the complexity of the challenges it faces, Somalia has achieved genuine progress on a number of fronts since 2012, several of which may serve as platform to support the Stabilization Strategy. These include the creation of four new federal states; following the recovery of a number of areas from Al-Shabaab, significant investments have been made in community projects and local governance; and the mutual commitments from both the Somali authorities and international partners articulated through the Security Pact based on the Comprehensive Approach to Security² are expected guide the Transition Plan.

However, the Somali authorities and population, together with AMISOM, continue to face the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, which has effectively reconstituted its operations as a rural insurgency, whilst continuing to mount terrorist attacks in urban areas. Although Al-Shabaab seeks to portray itself as an alternative Government, most assessments indicate that it continues to rely on violence and intimidation to coerce the population in its areas of influence and lacks the ability to provide a broad spectrum of services, but masks its shortcomings with a relatively sophisticated communication apparatus. Yet by denying the population access to the Government and the Government access to the population, Al-Shabaab retain the capacity to significantly undermine stabilization efforts.

¹ Further details and background are contained in the National Consultation Conference on Reconciliation Framework: Conflict and Peace Mapping Report produced by MoIFAR.

² The security aspects of the Transition Plan centre upon CAS strands 1 and 2, covering the mandated role of AMISOM in degrading Al-Shabaab and building effective and accountable Somali security institutions to assume full responsibility for the country's security.

The extension of state authority will remain predicated on three components — presence, capacity and legitimacy. In order to further bolster confidence in the Government, stabilization efforts must continue to support the expansion of Government capacity and presence at the Federal, State and district levels to represent the normative and legal order, and earn legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the population. These three components of extension of state authority are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Based on the different capacities and resources available to the new Federal Member States and Benadir Regional Authority, each will require differing types of support to address the challenges and opportunities faced. Even within States, progress has been uneven, with interventions often clustered at the State capital level. Whilst, much of this is linked to the state formation process, there remains a need to expand many programmes to outlying districts.

Local government is the first interface between citizens and their state. One of the lessons learnt from stabilization efforts under the previous strategy, is that access to justice and legal reform must be given higher priority in stabilization interventions. Moreover, helping citizens access justice – not just projecting the rule of law – is a critical element of security and peacebuilding. It is also recognized that the provision of justice and police services has lagged outside state capitals.

Outside the major urban areas of Mogadishu and the state capitals, assessments indicate economic growth and livelihoods in Somalia will remain highly dependent on agricultural production. Which underscores the importance of interventions to provide tangible socio-economic opportunities in communities to prevent the exploitation of socio-economic grievances and enable longer term poverty reduction programmes. The social fabric of Somalia society is heavily frayed by intra- and inter-community tensions. The development of effective and responsive reconciliation efforts at the grassroots level will be critical in ensuring local conflicts and other Government functions are managed in a way that supports wider state-building and peace-building goals. Included in these approaches will be a need to ensure both the government's ability to act as arbiters of communal conflict and for communities to peacefully arbitrate amongst each other.

Whilst stabilization interventions can play an important role in addressing many causes of fragility, they are not a panacea and expectations of progress must be carefully balanced in many areas of activity e.g. the formation of district councils versus the ability of districts to resource and implement services. It is imperative, therefore, that Federal Member States, with their support of the Federal Government, begin to develop strategies using a common set of approaches that result in coherent and interlinked stabilization interventions to communities to address the underlying cause of fragility.

3. Overall Goal, Focus Areas and Principles

The overall goal of the strategy will be to improve stability in Somalia by delivering tangible results that strengthen cohesion within communities and between communities and their government. Based upon the contextual analysis, the intent of the strategy is to support a combination peace and state-building interventions and prevent violence through the following efforts:

- Engage communities in dialogue to help them to address their legitimate grievances and develop confidence building measures as required
- Expand socio-economic opportunities to build resilient communities and reduce poverty with livelihood opportunities
- Promote transparency and inclusivity including supporting civil society to participate in governance structures, particularly at the State and District levels to increase Government legitimacy
- Provide justice and security services to all groups to demonstrate the extension of legitimate state authority

Collectively these interventions are intended to remove conflict drivers that are exploited by malign actors, particularly Al-Shabaab, and replace them by developing more inclusive, accountable and democratic structures. For example, the development of effective and responsive reconciliation efforts and governance structures are critical in ensuring local conflicts, service delivery and other Government functions are managed in a way that supports wider state-building and peace-building goals.

Focus Areas

Central to achieving this goal will be a renewed commitment to a whole of government approach across four inter-connected focus areas:

- i.) Community Recovery
- ii.) Social Reconciliation
- iii.) Local Governance
- iv.) Rule of Law

Collectively these interventions will aim to address the underlying causes of fragility and the accompanying conflict drivers that must be overcome to support state-building and peace-building efforts necessary to build a fully functional federal system in Somalia. Whilst MoIFAR has the convening role to support the whole of government approach for stabilization, it is acknowledged that each focus area will draw upon sector specific frameworks and initiatives led by the relevant Ministries based upon their responsibilities, as well as the mandates of key partners in the security sector i.e. AMISOM. In particular, the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) strands³ and its linkages to the security transition provide an important reference point, as do the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) pillar groups e.g. inclusive politics and rule of law. The development of the updated National Stabilization Strategy

³ The CAS is built around four main strands, with strand 2 comprised of three sub-strands, the strands are as follows; 1 – AMISOM, 2A – Defence, 2B – Internal Security, 2C – Justice, 3 – Stabilization Progress, and 4 – Countering / Preventing Violent Extremism (P/CVE).

commenced in the first half of 2017 and was followed by the development of the accompanying State level and BRA stabilization plans. This effort provided the basis for the stabilization elements included in the three core components of the Transition Plan, namely the (i) Operational, (ii) Institutional Capacity Building and (iii) Supporting Activities.

The complexity involved in addressing the security-development nexus is recognized by all stakeholders - there is no lasting security without development and yet there is no development without security. It will therefore be critical to ensure that stakeholders engaged in these processes that also engaged in the Stabilization Strategy actively support policy discussions. Which will in turn help guide programme interventions and address issues of sequencing and coherence e.g. incorporating assessments and plans linked to state level policing, SNA operational readiness assessments in the overall context of the implementation of the Transition Plan. MoIFAR together with its state counterparts will continue to lead efforts on the Government's Wadajir National Framework on Local Governance⁴ which addresses many of the key elements in the Stabilization Strategy. However, the Stabilization Strategy provides the overall platform to enhance coordination between MoIFAR and other key Ministries and their policy and programmatic efforts particularly the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Security with regard to the rule of law.

Guiding Principles:

Led by the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, in close coordination with the state Ministries of Interior of Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and the Benadir Regional Administration, FGS and FMS line ministry representatives and consultations with international partners, the updated strategy was designed based on the following premises:

- Stabilization efforts in Somalia are first and foremost a sensitive political process and therefore activities often require maximum adaptability to changing political circumstances. Moreover, activities within this complex, insecure and volatile context must be considered as high-risk investments.
- The development of strong Somali Government institutions at all levels is a generational task and the contribution of stabilization programs to strengthening government institutions must be prioritized for each activity and supported in the medium to long term. While some stabilization activities may be 'quick impact' interventions, institutional capacity building should be integrated into every intervention.
- Whilst addressing insecurity and linkages to military operations continue to represent an important aspect in the strategy, such operations are recognized as only one of a number of variables in a broader understanding of fragility and how fragility relates to community recovery and the accompanying peace-building and state-building processes.

⁴ The five components of the Wadajir Framework are: (a) social reconciliation, (b) peace dividends, (c) civic engagement, (d) local governance and (e) strategic communication. These elements can be considered a logical progression from the first FGS Stabilization Strategy which comprised of three interventions on (i) Formation of Local Administrations, (ii) Social Reconciliation and Civic Dialogues, and (iii) Community Peace Dividends.

- Geographic coverage; the updated stabilization strategy covers all areas in the four new Federal Member States⁵ and the Benadir Regional Administration. The Puntland authorities will reflect the principles and linkages of the strategy within their stabilization related initiatives as relevant and applicable⁶.
- Area based development approaches will be used to support coherence and sequencing of programme interventions across the four thematic focus areas, with emphasis on coordinating interventions at the district level through the state plans.
- The Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States need to strengthen coordination mechanisms to reflect the political progress in the respective states and ensure engagement with stabilization partners to build on current programmes.

4. Focus Areas

Collectively, the focus areas below intend to promote the extension of state authority presence, capacity, and legitimacy by supporting government led services, security, and social cohesion to communities identified by federal member states. The four focus areas below build upon efforts from the previous FGS stabilization strategy, but include a new focus on integrating activities to improve social cohesion, as well as recognizing that without stronger civilian-led security and justice, community recovery and reconciliation efforts may fail to sustain stability gains, including those prioritized through the Transition Plan. In addition to the four focus areas, the Stabilization Strategy will also link with cross-cutting issues supported by other Government strategies and policies e.g. the Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism strategy (see section 5).

The state level stabilization plans will be utilize an area based approach to promote a collective approach to stabilization interventions based on a nuanced understanding of local dynamics and drivers of fragility. These state plans will provide the basis of an ongoing and iterative coordination process that will help the prioritization and sequencing of activities including both assessments and programmes. Tied to the area based approach and sequencing of interventions is the recognition that programming orientated towards early recovery and longer-term development. In areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab and/or through reconciliation initiatives, the focus will be towards early recovery interventions that seek to rapidly demonstrate the extension of state, typically through community based projects and initial governance interventions such as interim administrations that then provide foundations for more developmental programmes. At the same there are a number of areas where fragility exists and/or progress has been made that allow more development orientated programmes to invest and consolidate progress to support broader the sustainable development and poverty reduction

⁵ As indicated section 1, the original FGS stabilization strategy focussed on covering 25 areas which were derived from AMISOM and the SNA operation plans.

⁶ A similar approach was agreed with the Wadajir Framework to recognize the progress made in areas such as local governance in Puntland, whilst simultaneously providing the opportunity to share experiences between Puntland and Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and the Benadir Regional Administration.

initiatives. The State implementation plans that accompany the strategy will be responsible for combining these elements.

Focus Area i) Community Recovery

Throughout the first phase of the FGS Ministry of Interior & Federal Affairs National Stabilization Strategy (launched in 2013), the majority of investments in support of the strategy could be characterized as Community Recovery initiatives. Donors such as the Somalia Stability Fund, USAID, and Norway funded programs and activities implemented by local and international partners such as TIS+, SSI/Dalbile, Nordic International Support (NIS), CPD, et al. that provided support to local communities and/or newly established caretaker district administrations. Such activities included construction / rehabilitation of public infrastructure such as administration offices, community centers, sports grounds, boreholes and community wells, solar street lights, repair to transport infrastructure, etc. While these activities are considered primarily as Community Recovery initiatives, some of them also enhance Rule of Law efforts, such as solar street lights improving public security and rehabilitation of a court house (by NIS in Waajid, Bakool Region) strengthening the judiciary.

Given the extent of needs especially in newly formed federal member states of Somalia, community recovery activities continue to be a focus area for the revised strategy. They have proven to benefit communities at the district level, and when implemented with government ownership and oversight, also serve to build the capacity of government administrations (both district and state) and enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of the community. This focus area aligns with Component 2 of the Wadajir Framework: Peace Dividends – Government in Practice, whose stated goal is *“to build capacity of local actors by providing practical experience of democratic practice while delivering basic services and infrastructure using community-driven approaches.”* The Government recognizes that each program or implementing partner uses its own methods for working with local administrations and communities, and does not seek to be overly prescriptive in this regard. However, the revised Stabilization Strategy does strongly recommend engaging with District Peace and Stability Committees, where they exist, or using the USAID TIS+ community engagement toolkit as a guide when embarking on community engagement to design and implement activities. In all cases, district administrations and FMS authorities should be intricately involved in community recovery initiatives.

Focus Area ii) Social Reconciliation

The importance of reconciliation has been consistently emphasized by Somalis from all communities, and is one of the priorities in the Government’s “Nabad iyo Nolol” strategy. This resulted in the national consultation on conflict and peace mapping in Somalia organized by MoIFAR from 13-17 June 2017. The consultation addressed a broad range of reconciliation issues and initiatives, and identified three broad categories of reconciliation that needed to be addressed in Somalia: 1) Political Reconciliation; 2) Social (Community) Reconciliation; and 3) Religious Reconciliation. The revised Stabilization Strategy focuses primarily on the second category, but through linking with the National P/CVE Strategy, also touches upon the third category. Whilst it is recognized the conflict in Somali is complex, multi-layered and multi-

dimensional, it is often intensely local in its character. Small scale and local conflicts are easily exploited by Al-Shabaab and used individually and collectively to undermine the broader state and peace-building processes. Therefore, the scope of the Stabilization Strategy efforts will be focused on community level reconciliation activities and the broader issues of political reconciliation are expected to be addressed through a number of other strategies, initiatives and mechanisms⁷. In particular, the following areas that are closely interlinked to the Wadajir Framework have been identified as follows:

- An entry point at the local community level is often a required precursor to enable extension of state authority, and perceptions of legitimacy e.g. formation of district administrations
- Social reconciliation amongst communities linked to grievances around historical disputes that have caused inter-community conflict e.g. access to water
- Mediation / conflict resolution to reduce active tensions within communities, particularly between non-state armed groups, that may be fueled by actions in response to historical disputes noted above

Stabilization related interventions are expected to include a broad range of both intra- and inter-community dialogues that seek to enhance social cohesion across these three areas. For example, this may include linking activities to strengthen formal and informal justice and governance institutions to resolve disputes and / or uphold agreements with tangible confidence building measures within an area. It also recognized that strengthening civil society is central to building inclusive, accountable and legitimate state institutions.

Focus Area iii) Local Governance

The fourth component of the Wadajir Framework is Local Governance: District Formation and Capacity Building. The revised Stabilization Strategy endorses initiatives by partners to support federal and FMS efforts to form legitimate district governance and to further build their capacity. These efforts are expected to address issues in three areas; administrative decentralization, political decentralization and fiscal decentralization. Capacity building of newly formed district administrations includes providing training for both local administrations and the wider community on governance structures and functions, roles and responsibilities, service delivery, with further capacity building for local administrations on revenue collection and management, planning, budgeting, transparency, and accountability.

South West State and Jubaland State have recently launched district council formation programs, following each state's passing of local governance legislation. Support should be provided to Galmudug and Hirshabelle States to enable them to draft and pass similar legislation so that district council formation processes are grounded in law. The Stabilization Strategy lauds the efforts of programs such as UNJPLG, the EU funded FCA/CRD local governance program, and

⁷ The National Consultation is anticipated to lead to further discussions including around the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission outlined under Article 111I of the draft constitution.

planned initiatives by the Somalia Stability Fund to assist FMS governments in district council formation. Each Federal Member State has developed its own list of districts prioritized for district council formation.

Focus Area iv) Rule of Law

Rule of Law programming and initiatives were notably absent from the first FGS Stabilization Strategy (2013-2017), which focused more on community recovery (peace dividends), reconciliation, and local governance. The past years have shown that without civilian security immediately following and working alongside military interventions, gains made in other areas of extending state authority (those noted above) remain fragile and incomplete. Local conflict can occur in areas under pro-government control, due to grievances between individuals and between community groups. The role and importance of traditional elders cannot be overstated in managing these disputes, their resolution must be accompanied by strong formal security and justice institutions to maintain social cohesion and the rule of law.

This revised Stabilization Strategy acknowledges the positive progress made thanks to international Rule of Law partners, including training of judiciary officers, and through AMISOM's police component in the recruitment and training of several hundred police in some of the federal member states, introduction of mobile courts to increase access to justice, and community policing models. However, these initiatives have largely been limited to FMS capitals, such as Kismayo and Baidoa (new civilian policing initiatives are underway in Beletweyne and Jowhar as of the time this strategy is being drafted). MoIFAR, FMS Ministries of Interior, and our FGS and FMS Ministries of Justice and Internal Security call for such initiatives to expand beyond the FMS capitals so that the benefits of such activities can be felt in districts across all regions, particularly those noted above, prioritized for district council formation. Newly formed district administrations require strong police and justice counterparts to support their efforts.

Challenges and Issues:

It is widely acknowledged by stabilization stakeholders that there is no purely security-military solution to the conflict, and a comprehensive civilian led approach across the stabilization strategy focus areas is critical to buttress and sustain the gains made in the security sector and through political dialogue. The practical challenges anticipated include:

- Provision of security for the population, to improve the credibility and legitimacy of state authority, and to provide access for UN, NGOs / Civil Society and donors in order to for programme interventions to move forward.
- Closely linked to security and access is the absorptive capacity of Somali institutions to lead coordination efforts, develop and implement policies.

The challenge currently faced in many programmes is a combination of how to expand interventions whilst balancing the risks related to security and access to ensure their inclusivity and sustainability. The implementation of the Transition Plan based upon the CAS framework will

provide a forum for addressing security and access of civilian actors and more importantly provide a level of predictability to allow joint planning between security and civilian actors. Equally important will be the need to balance investments in the security sector with support to key civilian line ministries at the Federal Government and the Federal Member State level. This includes expanding capacity at the state / district level, as well as promoting community and civil society engagement. These investments will be required to enhance Somali capabilities to lead and manage initiatives.

5. Cross-Cutting Issues

Inclusive and accountable approaches to peace-building and state-building across the four focus areas will reflect the Government of Somalia's commitments, strategies and policies related to (i) Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), (ii) Gender, and (iii) Youth. For example, with P/CVE issues this will include working with the relevant Government and International stakeholders to ensure stabilization programming is linked to Government's P/CVE strategy and related commitments outlined in the Security Pact / CAS architecture. In the case of the role of women and youth in stabilization related activities and projects, the normative frameworks involved are supported by a broader set of strategies and action plans linked to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security and Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) on Youth, Peace and Security. Given the breadth of activities encompassed under the different focus areas of stabilization strategy, programme intervention design to support inclusive approaches will vary, but the strategy recommends that programme interventions should aim to utilize 30% of available funds in support of gender and diversity based initiatives.

6. Coordination

Overall coordination of the Stabilization Strategy will be conducted through the bi-monthly Stabilization Meeting forum, led by MoIFAR and co-chaired by UNSOM CRESTA/A. The forum supports MoIFAR to convene and build a whole of government approach around the focus areas of the strategy with its Ministerial counterparts at both federal and state level in conjunction with donor, UN and civil society partners. It will also serve as the strategic coordination platform for Strand 3 of the CAS and the stabilization forum under the SDRF coordination architecture⁸. The forum serves as a horizontal coordination platform where stabilization stakeholders convene to discuss mutual areas of interest and linkages between activities, policy, and strategy e.g. sequencing between community policing initiatives and development of community recovery projects. Linked to the CAS architecture, a Planning and Delivery Team (PDT) will provide focus group to address specific issues linked to the strategy based on the direction of the main forum. It is also anticipated that through functioning as the CAS Strand 3 coordination platform, the forum

⁸ Based upon the overall coordination structures approved by the Government of Somalia with international partners on the CAS and SDRF. The Terms of Reference for both the main strand forum and the PDT were developed through the monthly Stabilization forum and will be reviewed annually.

will improve accountability insofar as stabilization efforts broader contribution to delivering on the Security Pact. At the state level, the respective Ministries of Interior, will convene a regular stabilization forum that will focus on their State stabilization implementation plan and provide the link to the districts and 'beelo' (communities)⁹.

Together the national and state level stabilization coordination forums and the coordination structures of the National Security architecture, such as the Implementation forum of the Transition Plan, will operate in mutually supporting manner. For example, the discussions around the implementation of the Transition Plan will identify priority locations for discussion in the national stabilization forum e.g. key routes / corridors. The national stabilization forum will provide updates on the overall progress with regard to stabilization activities in all areas. It is also anticipated that the Ministry of Interior in each state will ensure the relevant linkages are maintained with the Regional Security Councils (RSCs) to support the implementation of the provisions of the Security Pact and Transition Plan at the FMS level.

In addition, the regular inter-ministerial consultative forums between the MoIFAR and the FMS Ministries of Interior will continue to provide an important platform to support the Federal and State level meetings outlined above. These meetings take place in Mogadishu and in the capitals of the FMSs on a rotating basis, and have been utilized to develop this revised Stabilization Strategy.

To support these coordination of processes, MOIFAR and the State Ministries of Interior, are utilizing community level toolkits to support assessments and District Peace and Stability Committee (DPSC) formation. These tools, developed in conjunction with USAID TIS+ and UNJLPG, provide the basis for inclusive approaches to community recovery and engagement with local stakeholders to guide the design and implementation of stabilization projects.

7. Monitoring and Evaluation

Linked to the Stabilization Strategy's coordination structures is the need for effective monitoring and evaluation of the strategy to support evidence based decision making within the coordination structures. The aim of the monitoring and evaluation tools attached to the strategy is to ensure a common understanding amongst both national and international stakeholders. MoIFAR with the support of UNSOM CRESTA/A will use two tools to support the overall monitoring and evaluation of the strategy, (i) the 4W¹⁰ information management system and (ii) the Fragility Index & Maturity Model (FIMM).

⁹ This may include engagement with caretaker administrations, district peace and stability committees (DPSCs), district councils or village development or community development committees (VDCs / CDCs) depending on the local government arrangements in an area.

¹⁰ 4W tool collates information based on Who, What, Where and When format,

The 4W information management system collates data from the Government of Somalia, donors, UN and NGO partners on programme activities that are aligned to the Stabilization Strategy to provide a common operating picture. The data is designed to be collated into an infographic based dashboard to help identify trends and issues related to programme coverage. Issues linked to the data can be raised at coordination forums, e.g. MoIFAR Monthly Stabilization Meetings, as well as assist MoIFAR and its state counterparts in their engagement with other line Ministries e.g. Ministries of Planning and Aid Coordination Units. The FIMM will provide a measurable scorecard accompanied by a narrative analysis to help understand progress around the Government's stabilization strategy, providing stakeholders with evidence to better understand progress on governance, security, and socio-economic conditions at the district level. This will be accomplished by tracking a series of indicators in each area e.g. institutional progress of governance arrangements and establishment of judicial and policing services.

Together these two tools will support discussions to strengthen alignment, coordination and to build synergies among various programme interventions, particularly with regard to area based stabilization efforts. The continued development and roll out of the two tools will be reviewed on a regular basis to adjust their implementation / management. The FIMM will provide an important reference point in terms of tracking the progress at the district level to support the conditions based approach envisaged for the Transition Plan. In addition, the linkages between these two broad based tools and MoIFARs development of a more detailed monitoring and evaluation system linked to the Wadajir Framework will be reviewed in order to ensure complementarity in data collection and reporting.

While these two tools will serve a formal and regular means of providing lessons learnt, MoIFAR and UNSOM CRESTA/A will also manage an informal community of practice among stabilization stakeholders, sharing best practices learnt from efforts outside Somalia on stabilization and extension of state authority, in addition to sharing information and facilitating discussions around other assessments, analyses, and evaluations conducted by specific programmes in support of the Stabilization Strategy.

8. Strategic Communication

To support the Stabilization Strategy and the accompanying Stabilization Plans developed by the Federal Member states and Benadir Regional Authority, strategic communication efforts will be of paramount importance. First and foremost, strategic communication efforts will be required to underpin the credible and legitimate extension of the Somalia authorities' role and responsibilities at all levels of government to the population. It is also anticipated that Al-Shabaab will continue to discredit and prevent stabilization programmes in communities using a combination of violence and through its own communication channels (e.g. Radio Andalus). In doing so, Al-Shabaab is also expected to represent itself to the population in areas it controls or influences as a legitimate and equitable group, despite findings from research and assessments that indicate the group's

influence on the population is effectively derived from political manipulation and coercive force. Therefore, strategic communication efforts will need to focus on the two areas outlined below:

- (i) Promoting the Government's role and understanding of its efforts with particular regard to Stabilization Strategy and related Transition Plan initiatives with key stakeholders and communities, including the promotion of good governance, social reconciliation community recovery and the rule of law.
- (ii) Countering Al-Shabaab propaganda that seeks to undermine the efforts of the Government and its partners to implement stabilization initiatives, including addressing misconceptions perpetuated by Al-Shabaab that the group does not intimidate or exploit the population in areas under its control or influence.

Currently, the main strategic communication initiative supporting the stabilization strategy and accompanying plans is the Radio Wadajir platform led by the Federal Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism (MoICT) in conjunction with MoIFAR. The Radio Wadajir platform, currently supported financially by USAID TIS+, produces a bi-weekly radio programme linked to the communication objectives outlined in the Wadajir Framework to assist the State led outreach efforts to the population. It aims to promote a counter narrative to extremist voices, steering conversation away from Somalia's divisions and focusing instead on its commonalities amongst communities. Key messages have highlighted the stability gains made by the Government, including those linked good governance / district council formation, public service delivery and social reconciliation efforts. In addition, stabilization partners including USAID OTI, SSF, EU and UK ERI have supported a range of communication related initiatives to support opportunities for positive engagement between the government and communities and promote reconciliation dialogue in areas recovered from or still under Al-Shabaab control.

However, MoICT, MoIFAR and its counterparts have identified the need to expand efforts across traditional communication mediums and to social media platforms to provide a more comprehensive, responsive and flexible messaging effort. This will also require close collaboration with the efforts of other strands of the CAS framework, particularly the P/CVE strand, both in terms of addressing the extremist narratives perpetuated by Al-Shabaab and supporting programme efforts linked to the demobilization of ex-combatants.

9. Resources

Since 2015, the coordination arrangements for the strategy are supported at the Federal and District through MoIFAR by the Support to Stabilization (S2S) Project which received \$4m from the Immediate Response Fund of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). In addition, to personnel the S2S project also has provided funds to the Ministry to support caretaker

administrations and support community reconciliation dialogues¹¹. In addition, advisors on the Wadajir Framework in MoIFAR and the Ministry of Interior in Jubaland and Southwest States are supported by USAID TIS+ and the UK ERI is providing support to the development of the monitoring and evaluation tools to support the strategy and the development of the state plans. Prior to 2015, the UK Stabilization Unit and European Union provided stabilization advisors to support the Federal Government's coordination and development of the stabilization strategy.

To resource the Stabilization Strategy for 2018-2020, it is proposed to consolidate the current support provided by donors to the Government, together with options to expand such support to the Federal Member States that have received only limited technical assistance to date. Based on the current support, particularly the S2S project which was originally budgeted at \$2m per year, the estimated budget is \$2.5m per year to support the coordination, analytical and outreach activities of MoIFAR and the States including at the district / community level. This budget also reflects the need to increase the capacity of the Federal, State and District level to achieve the targets outlined in the Security Pact / CAS architecture to support the Transition Plan. MoIFAR together with its State counterparts will work partners to develop and implement a follow on initiative to the S2S project.

¹¹ The implementation of these project activities was supported by UNDP and helped support the pre-district council formation process.